Universal Morality and Relativism
The debate over universal morality and relativism concerns whether moral principles are objective and universally applicable across all human societies, or if they are culturally constructed and vary fundamentally. Evolutionary psychology investigates the origins of moral intuitions and behaviors, seeking to understand if a shared human moral architecture exists and how it might have evolved.
The Core Debate
The question of whether morality is universal or relative is a foundational philosophical problem with significant implications for evolutionary psychology. A universalist perspective posits that certain moral principles or judgments are inherent to human nature, shared across cultures, and perhaps even objectively true. Conversely, moral relativism argues that moral truths are contingent on cultural, historical, or individual perspectives, meaning there are no universally valid moral standards.
Evolutionary psychology approaches this debate by asking whether natural selection has shaped a common human moral faculty, leading to shared moral intuitions and behaviors. If such a faculty exists, it would suggest a basis for universal moral principles, even if their expression varies culturally. If, however, moral systems are primarily products of cultural learning without deep evolutionary roots, then relativism gains stronger support.
Evolutionary Perspectives on Moral Universals
Proponents of an evolutionary basis for universal morality often point to the recurrent challenges faced by ancestral humans, such as cooperation, conflict resolution, and resource allocation. Solving these problems would have conferred selective advantages, leading to the evolution of psychological mechanisms that predispose humans to certain moral judgments and behaviors. These mechanisms are not necessarily explicit rules but rather intuitive responses or emotional biases that guide social interaction.
One prominent theory is that of moral foundations theory (Haidt, 2012), which proposes that human moral psychology is built upon a small number of innate, universally available psychological systems that are sensitive to different categories of moral concern. These foundations include care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. While all cultures draw on these foundations, they prioritize and elaborate upon them differently, leading to cultural variations in moral codes. For example, individualistic cultures might emphasize care and fairness, while collectivistic cultures might place greater weight on loyalty and authority.
Other researchers, such as Tomasello (2016), argue that human morality emerged from unique capacities for shared intentionality and second-person morality, where individuals recognize each other as deserving of respect and fair treatment. This capacity for joint attention and cooperative communication is seen as a prerequisite for developing shared norms and obligations, which then become internalized as moral principles. The emphasis here is on the evolution of cooperation and altruism, which are fundamental to social living and require mechanisms for detecting and punishing cheaters, and rewarding cooperators (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).
Cross-cultural studies provide evidence for some moral universals. For instance, prohibitions against murder, incest, and indiscriminate lying, as well as injunctions to care for kin and reciprocate favors, appear in nearly all human societies (Brown, 1991). These regularities are interpreted by universalists as reflecting underlying evolved psychological predispositions rather than mere cultural convergence.
Arguments for Moral Relativism
Moral relativism, in its strongest forms, asserts that there are no objective moral truths that apply to all people. Instead, moral principles are seen as entirely products of culture, history, and individual experience. From an evolutionary perspective, this might imply that while humans have a capacity for norm-following and social learning, the specific content of those norms is highly flexible and not constrained by deep, evolved moral universals.
Anthropological evidence often highlights the vast diversity of moral practices across cultures. For example, practices concerning marriage, property rights, and the treatment of out-group members vary significantly. What is considered a moral obligation in one society might be morally neutral or even forbidden in another. Relativists argue that these differences are not superficial variations on universal themes but rather reflect fundamentally different moral frameworks.
Some evolutionary psychologists acknowledge that while basic moral intuitions might be universal, the application and elaboration of these intuitions are heavily influenced by cultural learning and ecological factors. For example, while fairness might be a universal moral foundation, what constitutes
- Google Scholar: Universal Morality and RelativismScholarly literature; ranked by Google Scholar's relevance.
- Moral MindsMarc Hauser · 2006Accessible introduction
Hauser proposes a universal moral grammar, analogous to Chomsky's linguistic grammar, suggesting that humans are born with an innate capacity for moral judgment. He explores how this 'grammar' generates diverse moral systems across cultures, providing an evolutionary framework for understanding moral universals.
- The Righteous MindJonathan Haidt · 2012Recent synthesis
Haidt explores the evolutionary origins of moral intuition and how it shapes our political and religious views. He argues that morality is largely intuitive and emotional, with reason serving to justify pre-existing judgments, offering a nuanced perspective on moral foundations and cultural variation.
- Moral OriginsChristopher Boehm · 2012Academic monograph
Boehm investigates the evolutionary roots of human morality, focusing on how social selection and the suppression of bullies in small-scale societies led to the development of conscience and altruism. This book provides a compelling account of how egalitarianism shaped our moral landscape.
- The Evolution of MoralityRichard Joyce · 2006Counterpoint perspective
Joyce offers a philosophical and evolutionary account of morality, arguing that moral judgments are adaptive but ultimately represent 'useful fictions.' He explores the meta-ethical implications of an evolutionary origin for morality, questioning the objective truth of moral claims.
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- Adaptationist Accounts of ReligionAdaptationist accounts of religion propose that religious beliefs and practices, or the psychological mechanisms that give rise to them, are adaptations that evolved due to their fitness benefits for individuals or groups. These theories contrast with by-product explanations, which view religion as an incidental outcome of cognitive architecture evolved for other purposes.
- Afterlife BeliefsAfterlife beliefs refer to the conviction that some aspect of an individual's consciousness or identity persists beyond physical death. Evolutionary psychology investigates the cognitive mechanisms and social functions that may have contributed to the widespread prevalence and persistence of such beliefs across diverse human cultures.
- Big Gods HypothesisThe Big Gods hypothesis proposes that belief in powerful, morally concerned, and omniscient deities evolved as a mechanism to foster large-scale cooperation and prosociality among genetically unrelated individuals, thereby facilitating the emergence and stability of complex societies. It suggests that such beliefs served to enforce moral norms and deter free-riding, particularly in contexts where direct monitoring was impractical.
- Born-Believers HypothesisThe born-believers hypothesis posits that humans possess innate cognitive biases and mechanisms that predispose them to religious belief, rather than religion being solely a product of cultural learning. This perspective suggests that certain aspects of religious thought emerge as byproducts of evolved cognitive architecture designed for other adaptive functions.
- By-product Accounts of ReligionBy-product accounts of religion propose that religious beliefs and practices are not direct adaptations for specific functions but rather emergent consequences of cognitive mechanisms that evolved for other, non-religious purposes. This perspective views religion as an incidental outcome of ordinary mental faculties operating in specific social and environmental contexts.
- Cooperation at ScaleCooperation at scale refers to the human capacity for large-group cooperation, extending beyond kin and reciprocal dyads, which is a distinctive feature of human societies. This phenomenon is central to understanding the evolution of complex social structures and institutions.